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 Reports findings from a major ‘Policy Delphi’ expert survey on UK energy futures  
 Survey is designed to consider the ‘smart and local energy revolution’ proposition 
 Results question the likelihood and desirability of a wholesale energy revolution 
 Whole system analysis should go beyond any single uniform transition narrative 






Alongside ambitious targets for economy-wide decarbonisation, a ‘smart and local energy 
revolution’ narrative has recently emerged in energy policy and research. To consider the 
energy revolution proposition, this paper presents findings from a Policy Delphi survey of 
interdisciplinary energy researchers and stakeholders (n=113) on alternative transition 
paths (disruptive or continuity-led) for the UK energy system. The paper includes 
quantitative and qualitative survey findings on a number of social and technical aspects of 
the energy revolution proposition: system governance, security and flexibility arrangements, 
power sector decarbonisation, the future of large supply firms and energy policy priorities. 
The results suggest that rather than a wholesale revolution, the UK’s energy transition over 
the next two decades will involve a mix of disruptive and continuity-led elements. Experts 
differ on a number of issues associated with the energy revolution proposition, including the 
impact of demand side response on whole system flexibility, and whether energy systems 
are best governed at a local or national scale. However, rather than having fixed 
orientations to either disruption or continuity-led change, most experts respond on an 
issue-by-issue basis. The energy revolution proposition is socially constructed and 
contestable, and whole energy systems policy and research should go beyond uniform 
transition narratives.  
Keywords 




There has been a radical turn in recent UK energy policy rhetoric. While this has a number of 
features, it involves strong commitments to ‘smartness’ (or digitalisation) and ‘localisation’ 
(or decentralisation) – often summarised as a ‘smart and local energy revolution’. Less than 
a decade ago, the UK Government considered that there was “no reasonable alternative” to 
a massive re-investment in the UK’s national, centralised system of electricity generation 
and transmission, concluding that “the Government does not believe that decentralised and 
community energy systems are likely to lead to significant replacement of larger-scale 
infrastructure” (DECC, 2011, p.24).  
Six years later, the UK Government launched a new economy-wide Industrial Strategy, 
including a Prospering from the Energy Revolution theme aimed at developing “world-
leading local smart energy systems” (HMG, 2017, p.45). Soon after, the then Secretary of 
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy heralded a new era of energy system 
change, contrasting a historic emphasis on “a centralised grid that would deliver secure 
supplies more cheaply than did [sic] decentralisation” with a future characterised by 
“embedded generation co-located with storage, demand-side management, energy 
efficiency and AI-enabled control” (Clark, 2018).  
This revolutionary turn has already gone beyond rhetoric: a raft of spending commitments 
followed the publication of the Industrial Strategy White Paper, and the UK Government has 
committed to investing over £100m on Prospering from the Energy Revolution related 
activities, including a new Energy Revolution Research Consortium (UKRI, n.d.). Promoting 
‘smart local energy systems’ is also a key pillar of the Scottish Government’s Energy Strategy 
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(Scottish Government, 2017) and enthusiasm for a smart and local energy revolution is a 
defining concern for some key publicly funded UK innovation bodies, such as the Energy 
Systems Catapult (New, 2016). 
An energy revolution narrative is evident internationally, reflecting the reducing cost of 
some small scale generation and storage technologies, the impact of digital technologies on 
energy network management, and a political trend toward regionalisation and devolution. A 
raft of studies by energy consultancy firms and industry associations has presented the case 
for a decentralised energy revolution; for example, the President of the UK’s Energy 
Institute stated that “Today’s energy system is undergoing a quiet revolution, driven by an 
everchanging global political landscape, climate change challenges and a range of 
innovations influencing energy consumption” (Energy Institute, 2017, p.4). The consultancy 
firm PwC has argued that: “From a scale-driven, centralised and standardised model, the 
sector is set to evolve to one that is digital, distributed and personalised” (PwC, 2016, p.3). 
In its 2018 Energy Visions report, PwC declared that the energy sector had entered a 
“decade of disruption” (PwC, 2018).  
The concepts of energy disruption and revolution are also attracting academic interest. Jalas 
et al. (2019) note that energy disruption metaphors are in frequent use in strategic energy 
research agendas, with some emerging technologies seen as constituting a major disruption 
in energy systems. Wilson and Tyfield (2018) consider a range of different academic 
perspectives on the links between energy transformation and disruptive innovation. 
Johnstone et al. (2020) note that the notion of ‘clean energy disruption’ has become 
widespread, and go on to consider how it has manifested across a number of social and 
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technical dimensions in German and UK energy systems. Lindberg et al. (2019) analyse 
alternative energy pathways in EU energy policy documents, distinguishing between 
decentralised (high disruption) and centralised (low disruption) transition paths, while 
Brisbois (2020) considers the disruptive impact of decentralisation dynamics on energy 
transition policy-making in Canada.  
From a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective, assessing the smart and local energy 
revolution proposition is challenging. While the suggested benefits include community 
empowerment, local economic growth and capturing the benefits of demand side flexibility 
(Hall and Roelich, 2015; Braunholtz-Speight et al., 2019), there are also some concerns. A UK 
parliamentary committee identified some risks of energy decentralisation, including 
piecemeal development and an erosion of universal service provision and cost socialisation 
(UK Parliament, 2017). Large integrated energy systems continue to offer some economic, 
technical and societal advantages, and scale economies remain significant in many areas 
(McKenna, 2018) – indeed, they have driven much of the UK’s decarbonisation 
achievements over the past two decades (BEIS, 2019). 
There are also more socio-historic reasons to question (or at least problematise) 
revolutionary and disruptive narratives of change. For Paul Edwards, a historical analysis of 
infrastructure may usefully challenge more immediate disruption narratives (Edwards et al., 
2009; see also Edgerton, 2010). While emerging data technologies create new possibilities 
for decentralised, reconfigurable infrastructures (Egyedi and Mehos, 2012), energy 
infrastructures have historically often been ‘accomplishments of scale’, as local systems are 
joined together over time (Jackson et al., 2007).  
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Other scholars have highlighted the politically contested nature of infrastructure system 
building, across municipal, national and international scales (Van der Vleuten et al., 2013). In 
the UK, the historic shift away from municipal and regional control of energy infrastructure 
was itself contested (Hannah, 1979; Hughes, 1983); Arapostathis et al. (2014, p.87) 
described the shift from municipal ‘town gas’ supply to GB-wide system integration in the 
1960s and ‘70s as a ‘complex and uncertain socio-technical process’.  
Scale-based contestations are also evident in future infrastructure visions and scenarios. 
Hommels et al. (2013) observed how both centralisation and decentralisation narratives are 
seen by their respective advocates as compelling solutions to system challenges and 
vulnerabilities. Schiølin (2019, p.4) warns that “revolutionary dreams” in futures narratives – 
using the cover of supposed inevitability – are often ways to exercise power and social 
control. Weijers (2012) also emphasised that infrastructure scale dynamics should be seen 
as socially, technically and politically contested. Lagendijk and Van der Vleuten (2013, p.97) 
concluded that the key research task was to “highlight and interrogate … entanglements 
between international, national and local processes, not obscure and erase them”.  
Here, we consider this analytical challenge in the context of contemporary energy 
transitions, and the smart and local energy revolution proposition. We report selected 
findings from a large survey of energy experts on the likelihood and desirability of distinctive 
transition paths for the UK – one more disruptive and locally oriented, the other more 
continuity-led and nationally oriented. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces 
our survey research method and discusses methodological aspects and reviews some similar 
studies; Section 3 presents selected survey findings on selected issues related to the UK’s 
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smart and local energy revolution narrative; Section 4 summarises and discusses the 
findings alongside other studies and Section 5 concludes. 
2  Research Method 
2.1 Policy Delphi and Energy Transitions 
Delphi is a widely used expert elicitation method, founded on the suggested benefits of 
interaction and iteration of expert views using multi-round surveys (Linstone and Turoff, 
2011; Dayé, 2018). The method has been used in different forms in futures studies since the 
early 1970s, and has been applied in UK Foresight studies, European ERA-net research for 
science and technology strategy (Miles et al., 2016) and in some recent energy transition 
studies in Europe (BDEW, 2015; Jalas et al., 2019).  
Several different versions of the Delphi method have been developed (Miles et al., 2016); 
among these, Policy Delphi is distinctive in that, rather than developing consensual ‘best 
guesses’ to feed into forecasting exercises, it recognises that policy problems typically have 
multiple discourses and viewpoints, dispersed by region, role and discipline (Turoff, 2002, 
cited in de Loë et al., 2016, p.82).  
Policy Delphi aims to “explore or expose underlying assumptions or information leading to 
differing judgements” (Turoff, 1970, p.149) and “reveal options and alternatives, points of 
agreement and disagreement, clarify arguments and uncover the strength of evidence 
associated with diverse viewpoints” (de Loë et al., 2016, pp. 78-79).  
De Loë et al. (2016, p.80) note Policy Delphi’s value as an interdisciplinary tool, as it is able 
to address “complex and intertwined subjects” that cross over disciplinary boundaries and 
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range across political, environmental, social and technological considerations. An Expert 
Elicitation Task Force convened by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009, 
p.84) noted that for these kinds of problem, “differences in response may result from 
different paradigms by which experts view the world”. In these situations, reconciling expert 
differences may be imprudent (Morgan, 2011) – rather, the need is to map different 
opinions, and understand the reasonings behind them. The breadth of the issues involved in 
Policy Delphi studies, spanning multiple sectors and groups, warrants a lengthy and iterative 
consultation process (Devaney and Henchion, 2018). 
Given these aims, it is perhaps surprising that Policy Delphi has found relatively little 
application at the research-policy interface of sustainable energy transitions, and there are 
very few close precedents to our large scale and broad ranging expert survey. In their critical 
review of energy scenario methods, Trutnevyete et al. (2016) – although not directly 
referencing Policy Delphi – recommended incorporating a diverse range of experts and 
stakeholders, and of counter-posing different views in a structured way. Even so, recent 
Delphi studies of energy transitions – and energy expert surveys more generally – tend to 
seek the majority view of the response base rather than mapping and exploring areas of 
disagreement. They also tend to be technology-centric; for example, Grafakos and 
Flamanos’s survey of European energy experts (Grafakos and Flamanos, 2017) is aimed at 
quantifying the extent of agreement or disagreement across a series of technology focussed 
issues. 
The main concerns of the Smart Energy Finland (SET) Delphi study (Ahonen et al., 2018; Jalas 
et al., 2019) were also technological, in terms of gathering expert expectations of the impact 
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of a range of disruptive technologies, to consider how the Finnish energy sector might adapt 
and prosper – reflecting the research consortium’s base in supply side technical expertise. 
The SET survey’s alternative transition pathways focussed on alternative future technology 
portfolios rather than alternative socio-technical combinations. Jalas et al. (2019, p.51) 
noted that after the SET study’s focus on technology was met with criticism, it was 
broadened to make a ‘reflexive space’ for considering the potential impacts of smart energy 
technology, recognising that need to “evoke uncertainty and problematize energy futures”; 
however, they didn’t problematise the dominant narrative of disruption. 
A closer parallel with our study is the ‘Delphi Energy Future 2040’ study (hereafter ‘DEF’) 
(BDEW et al., 2016). This shared our concern to “connect specialists from different areas of 
expertise”, combine different perspectives and identify dissenting as well as majority 
opinions (ibid., p.4). DEF’s survey questions covered a wide range of social and technical 
aspects of disruptiveness, including system decentralisation and bottom-up social 
movements. As in our study (see 2.2, below), these aspects were presented as a series of 
propositions of energy futures, with expert respondents invited to agree or disagree with 
the proposition. The DEF report also includes illustrative comments representing 
respondents’ alternative views – although there is little attention to quantitatively or 
qualitatively analysing the reasons for disagreement.  
Expert surveys are also conducted by some energy consulting firms and industry 
associations (e.g. PwC, 2019; Energy Institute, 2019). These tend to adopt a business 
strategy perspective. For example, the UK’s Energy Institute conducts an annual ‘Energy 
Barometer’ survey which has some similarities to our study, in terms of its UK national 
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focus, and in its attention to both mapping the spread of views across the survey sample 
and reporting some respondents’ comments. However, rather than exploring alternative UK 
energy transition narratives, the Energy Barometer’s main concern is to develop a sector 
view on issues such as policy instability and investment risk – the 2018 survey noted the 
high degree of consensus on most issues (Energy Institute, 2018, p.35). It also draws on a 
mostly business response base: in the 2018 survey only 20% of respondents were from 
academia and research (ibid.). A brief comparison of our results with those in the DEF and 
Barometer surveys is presented in the discussion section of this paper (see 4.3). 
 
2.2 Survey Design 
Our Policy Delphi survey was designed to map and understand expert opinion on 
contrasting disruptive and continuity-led scenarios for the UK energy transition. As 
exploratory scenarios, these offer “internally consistent and plausible alternative storylines 
describing a number of possible longer term futures, often including trend-breaks” 
(McDowall and Eames, 2006, p.1238). The disruptive scenario resembles the ‘smart and 
local energy revolution’ narrative described above, in that digitalisation and smaller scale 
generation and storage innovations, and a growing emphasis on local energy governance, 
encourage a radical decentralisation of the system, both technically and institutionally. By 
contrast, in the continuity-led scenario, the UK’s energy transition is pursued mainly by 
repurposing existing organisations and infrastructures, without fundamentally disrupting or 
rescaling the system.  
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Our survey invitees were identified from a range of sources: academic researchers 
associated with the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), other senior researchers in the 
‘whole systems’ theme of the UK Research Councils / UKRI energy research programme and 
through ‘snowballing’ with assistance from the UKERC community. Stakeholder invitees 
included analysts and officials working in public policy, intermediary and advisory roles, 
third sector organisations and business stakeholders. Among business stakeholders, we 
purposely sought to strike a balance between ‘incumbents’ (i.e. those with longstanding 
energy interests) and ‘disrupters’ (those with emerging interests). Invitations were emailed 
to over 600 UK-based individuals across these different groups – a large and heterogeneous 
invitation list. 
The survey was designed to cover a broad range of topic areas, across both the UK energy 
system as a whole and specific sectors such as heating, power and transport. The year 2040 
was chosen as the time horizon for most of the survey questions, to strike a balance 
between unconstrained change over long timescales and highly constrained change over 
short timescales (Jalas et al., 2019). For each survey question, participants were presented 
with short propositions, questions or suggestions describing features of the future UK 
energy system or the transition pathway between now and 2040.  
Consistent with other Policy Delphi studies (de Loë, 1995), participants were asked to assess 
the likelihood (or in some cases desirability) of the propositions on a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from ‘highly likely’ to ‘highly unlikely’, with an additional option of 
‘undecided/cannot say’. For each question, respondents were then invited to explain their 
reasoning in a text box, mentioning any relevant sources of evidence that informed their 
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view. In this way, the survey went beyond mapping expert views, to explore the reasoning 
and evidence bases involved.  
In the second round of the survey, we presented the whole sample quantitative Likert-scale 
results from Round 1, and also a summary of the different reasonings behind different Likert 
scale answers, as expressed in respondents’ free text comments; we then invited 
respondents to respond to the sample-wide results, confirm or revise their own first round 
answer, and offer any reasons for maintaining or changing their view. Qualitative responses 
were coded in NVivo, and were analysed independently by the two authors, to identify the 
full range of perspectives and reasonings. Any differences of interpretation of qualitative 
data were extensively discussed and then reconciled by the authors.  
 
2.3 Survey Sample 
Our survey was conducted over two rounds in late 2017 and in early 2018. 127 people 
completed Round 1 (a 22% response rate), 69 of whom also completed Round 2 (a 54% 
response rate from Round 1), although not all respondents answered all questions, and only 
113 respondents answered the specific questions reported in this paper. The overall sample 
sizes and response rates are within the ranges reported by other comparable Policy Delphi 
studies (Nowack et al., 2011; de Loë et al., 2016), and suggest a high level of interest among 
energy researchers and stakeholders, particularly since our survey was relatively lengthy, 
with over 20 detailed questions across nine topic areas, and over 100 specific prompts 
inviting a response.  
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The first section of the survey gathered information about our respondents. Round 1 
respondents came from varied disciplinary backgrounds (Figure 1). Of those who declared a 
disciplinary affiliation, 30% identified as social scientists (other than economists); 28% as 
engineers; 22% as economists; 17% as environmental scientists; 11% as physical scientists 
and 20% as ‘other’. (The figures sum to over 100% because many respondents identified 
themselves as having multiple disciplinary affiliations). The most common ‘other’ 
disciplinary identities included business, complexity science, energy modelling, 
interdisciplinary research, maths and operational research, policy, statistics and technology 
assessment. 
Most Round 1 respondents described themselves as having a senior role (68%); 16% had a 
mid-career role and 16% an early career role. Geographically, respondents were well 
distributed across the UK, with 83% based in England (just over one-third London-based, the 
others spread across all English regions), 12% in Scotland and 4% in Wales.   































The Round 1 sample comprised 45 non-academic stakeholders (35% of respondents), 45 
non-UKERC academic researchers (35%) and 37 UKERC academic researchers (29%), so that 
the response base was just under two-thirds academic researchers and just over one-third 
non-academic stakeholders. Response rates were slightly higher for UKERC invitees (23%) 
compared to non-UKERC researchers (20%) and non-academic stakeholders (19%) – perhaps 
reflecting our regular interactions with UKERC during survey development. To be inclusive 
with respect to the UK’s interdisciplinary research community we chose not to filter-out 
responses in order to ‘even-up’ the different categories of respondent. 
There are varied views in the Delphi and Policy Delphi literature about the desirable 
composition of a Policy Delphi response base. Many analysts suggest that respondents 
should be as diverse as possible – Winkler and Moser (2016, p.72) argue that “heterogeneity 
is valuable in mitigating all of the major biases that are at play in Delphi studies”. Beyond 
this, there is no agreed formula (Winkler and Moser, 2016; Dayé, 2018). Devaney and 
Henchion (2018) recommend a mix of breadth, depth and objectivity among respondents, 
including both existing and potential ‘value chain’ holders alongside more independent 
experts.  
Needham and de Loë (1990) distinguish between ‘subjective experts’ (e.g. business 
representatives), ‘mandated experts’ (policymakers, regulators etc.), and ‘objective experts’ 
(publicly funded researchers). While a mix of these types is seen as useful, having a majority 
of researchers is seen to offer some advantages, as the response base is then considered 
less influenced by vested interests. However, researchers may be biased towards particular 
innovation breakthroughs and research in particular fields, and they may have limited 
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commercial understandings. Some analysts suggest that mandated experts are more neutral 
arbitrators of different interests (Devaney and Henchion, 2018). 
To mitigate systematic bias in our academic response base, we chose not to issue invitations 
to researchers in domain-specific parts of the UKRI Energy Programme, as we considered 
this to be more likely to introduce technology- or solution-specific orientations or biases. 
UKERC is a large, independent and interdisciplinary network of academic researchers (we 
invited all research members of UKERC as of late 2017, n=162). While UKERC is dedicated to 
supporting a sustainable energy transition for the UK, it does not advocate or preferentially 
generate evidence for particular energy transition pathways in terms of scale, technologies, 
or social practices. Our non-UKERC academic invitees (n=220) were all investigators (grant 
holders) in the ‘Whole Systems’ theme of the UKRI Energy Programme, and as such can be 
expected to have a relatively holistic and interdisciplinary perspective on UK energy system 
change.  
We invited 232 non-academic stakeholders. Following Needham and de Loë’s (1990) expert 
typology, our non-academic respondents (n=45) were almost equally divided between 
mandated experts (47%) and subjective experts (53%) (see Appendix A). Further 
categorising the subjective experts, in terms of having a clear orientation towards either 
disruptive or continuity-led energy transition was not possible in most cases, and 54% of 
subjective experts are considered to have neither; 25% can be considered to be oriented to 
continuity-led change (as they have mostly incumbent vested interests) and 21% to 
disruptive change (as they have mostly emergent vested interests). However, the number of 
subjective experts with clearly identifiable orientations is small: only 11 respondents (9% of 
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the total response base), and overall, the vast majority of our respondents have no clear 
upfront affiliation to either continuity-led or disruptive change.  
An important methodological concern for holistic interdisciplinary surveys is the level of 
expertise of individual respondents. At the start of our survey, participants were asked to 
self-assess their level of expertise across the nine different topic areas of the survey, in 
terms of being a ‘domain expert contributor’, a ‘well informed non-domain expert’ or having 
a ‘non-expert lay view’. For all nine topic areas, more respondents described themselves as 
being well informed non-domain experts than domain experts. The ‘energy system overall’ 
topic had the highest level of self-assessed expertise, above any domain-specific topic. Our 
results therefore reflect more generalist, interdisciplinary energy expertise than domain-
specific specialist expertise, reflecting our focus on the UK’s ‘whole energy systems’ 
academic research community. 
Again, the methodological literature suggests that this may be an advantage. For Policy 
Delphi surveys that address complex and open socio-technical systems, no single 
respondent can hold an expert opinion across all the different areas involved, especially if 
the system is expected to undergo a multi-faceted transition (Devaney and Henchion, 2018). 
In these contexts, specialist expertise offers limited foresight, and multi-domain experts 
may be better able to anticipate change (Tetlock, 2005; Grisham, 2008). According to 
Linstone (1975, 581; cited in Needham and de Loë, 1990) specialists tend to focus on a 
subsystem rather than system whole, and in such situations ‘generic functional knowledge’ 
may hold greater value (Tetlock, 2005). 
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Another relevant methodological issue is Delphi respondents’ propensity to engage with 
others’ views and reconsider their own views over successive survey rounds. ‘Belief 
persistence’ is widely found in multi-round Policy Delphi surveys (Makkonen et al., 2016). 
For Winkler and Moser (2016), a low propensity to change view reflects ‘hypothesis-based 
filtering’, as respondents tend to adopt a position and then select evidence and arguments 
to defend it; Bolger and Wright (2011) referred to it as ‘egocentric discounting’ – weighting 
one’s own opinion above the views of others. In this context, Devaney and Henchion (2018) 
concluded that any recognition whatsoever of others’ views should be seen as a distinct 
success of the Policy Delphi method. The apparently very low level of interaction seen in our 
results also overlooks the implicit, unstated way that many Delphi survey respondents react 
to the views of others, perhaps reflecting participant fatigue (Dayé, 2018). 
3 Results 
3.1 Introduction  
This section presents selected findings from our Policy Delphi survey, on particular issues 
related to the smart and local energy revolution proposition for the UK energy system 
transition: energy system governance, security and flexibility arrangements, power sector 
decarbonisation, the future of large supply firms and policy priorities.  
In our Round 2 survey, the vast majority of all Likert scale responses (89%) involved no 
explicit response or change to Round 1 results. Of the 11% of responses which involved 
either a change of view or an explicit response to Round 1 results, over three quarters (76%) 
either offered no reason for changing or gave a reason which didn’t explicitly reference 
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others’ views. Among the small proportion of responses which explicitly referenced others’ 
Round 1 views, most (59%) maintained their own view – only 41% involved a change of 
view. This means that, although most Round 2 participants (71%) changed at least one of 
their answers, only 1% of all Round 2 individual responses involved both an explicit 
reference to others’ Round 1 views and a change in their own view. 
Given the very limited number of changes of view in Round 2 results, and the much larger 
number of respondents in Round 1, this section presents results mostly from Round 1 – 
although a short discussion of Round 2 findings is also given for most issues. (To reduce 
participant fatigue and avoid repetition, the Round 2 survey omitted some Round 1 
questions).  
Alongside the Round 1 quantitative results, a range of different written responses is 
included, so as to demonstrate the variety of respondents’ views and reasonings. In line 
with mixed methods literature (Small, 2011), the qualitative data was analysed thematically 
to reveal the common themes, key areas of divergence, and surprising insights underlying 
the Likert scale responses to each proposition in the survey. For each question, we present 
illustrative reasonings associated with majority / dominant and minority / marginal Likert 
scale responses. 
3.2 Energy System Governance 
Survey participants were asked to assess three different propositions about future UK 
energy system governance: 
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1. The UK state is moving decisively away from centralised control, with greater powers 
to nations, regions and cities. So by 2040, UK energy systems will reflect regional and 
local priorities above national strategy and operation 
2. By 2040, there will be a greater spread of powers between national and local bodies, 
with planning and implementation devolved to local and regional authorities but 
with national government, regulators and system operators remaining as the main 
system strategists 
3. The distribution of powers between national and local authorities in 2040 will largely 
resemble those of today, with national strategy and planning remaining dominant 
As shown in Figure 2, the survey sample considered the second proposition (‘greater spread 
of powers’) most likely; over three-quarters (77%) of all respondents saw this option as 
either likely or highly likely. This was more than double the number of respondents (35%) 
who saw the ‘no significant change’ proposition (option 3) as likely or highly likely. The 
‘decisively decentralised’ proposition (option 1) was seen as the least likely – only 30% of 
respondents judged it likely or highly likely. Overall, this suggests most experts expect a 




Figure 2: Possible governance arrangements for the UK energy system in 2040 
 
In their comments, several respondents noted that UK energy governance arrangements 
were already changing, with some powers being transferred to devolved governments, and 
some local authorities developing local energy strategies. However, participants disagreed 
on the significance (and merit) of these changes, and on how much further they would (and 
should) develop by 2040.   
Those anticipating only a limited shift to decentralised governance noted the political 
sensitivities of energy policy and the perceived need to retain a coherent national strategy; 
others saw decentralised governance as undesirable and costly, given the suggested greater 
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‘Some decisions can only be taken by national government … Politically I 
think it unlikely that central government will take a step back from 
energy.’ 
Official in a public body 
 ‘On a whole systems basis I can only see energy becoming more 
centralised not less … some of the big decisions we have to make will have 
to be made centrally.’ 
Senior industry consultant 
‘Economies of scale … mean that a fully decentralised system is unlikely unless 
affordability of energy ceases to be a goal.’  
Senior academic mathematician 
By contrast, others suggested that localised governance was a welcome and increasingly 
important enabler of the UK’s energy transition: 
‘The low carbon transition … needs policy development on a more regional 
scale with more focus on the requirements of individual regions and 
communities.’ 
Mid-management industry specialist 
‘The state can no longer afford the inefficiencies of centralised control.’ 
Chair of an environmental NGO 
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Some respondents described a combination of technological, economic and political forces 
driving decentralisation, including digital technologies and the changing political ambitions 
and economic circumstances of local authorities. 
 ‘Provision of energy services provides a potential revenue stream and 
enables delivery of social objectives … local bodies will become more 
involved.’ 
Senior Lecturer in engineering 
‘Distributed energy is very fashionable, regardless of whether it is the most 
cost-effective solution.’ 
Mid-career economist in a public body 
In Round 2, the vast majority of respondents (96%) either didn’t respond to the invitation to 
reconsider their view, or expressed an unchanged view. Several respondents offered new 
comments without changing their Likert scale responses, but most of these didn’t engage 
directly with others’ views from Round 1. Only two respondents changed their Likert scale 
responses – both now favouring the majority view that a greater spread of powers was most 
likely. 
3.3 Security and Flexibility Arrangements 
Participants were asked to assess a single proposition about UK energy system security and 
flexibility provision in 2040, for two different sectors: 
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 UK energy system security and flexibility will rely more on local balancing and 
reserves than on international trade and national balancing (a) for heating in 
buildings, and (b) for power 
As Figure 3 shows, many respondents thought a greater reliance on local balancing and 
reserves was either likely or highly likely for both heating in buildings (52% of all responses) 
and power (46%); at the same time, there was a relatively high number of ‘undecided or 
cannot say’ responses to this question (23% of all responses for buildings’ heating and 22% 
for power).  
Figure 3: Energy security and flexibility in 2040: will local sources dominate? 
               (a) for heating in buildings                                   (b) for power 
 
Some respondents’ comments highlighted the multiple factors at work in providing energy 
system flexibility and security – including policy choices on heat sector decarbonisation and 
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electricity interconnectors – and were unable or unwilling to give a firm answer. Others 
argued that system security would be predominantly provided at the local scale by 2040: 
‘[Given] the emergence of smart systems and the general need to 
decarbonise … I would expect the national system to be supplementary to 
local flexibility.’ 
Senior official in a public body 
‘The ability of smart [technology] to open up new demand response 
opportunities and the variable & inflexible nature of many new assets on 
the system should all create much stronger incentives for local balancing 
services than in the past.’ 
Mid-management economist in a public body 
By contrast, others argued that national infrastructure and international trading would continue to 
play a dominant role: 
‘interconnection is important to do the balancing … there is not enough 
local generation.’ 
Senior academic engineer 
‘The majority of heating in 2040 is still likely to be from gas, the bulk of which 
will be imported.’ 
Modelling analyst in a public sector body 
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There were varied views on whether heating or power was more likely to see a shift to 
localised balancing and security:  
‘Decarbonising heat may well involve more localised sources … for power, 
interconnectors are still likely to play an important role’ 
Mid-career advisor in a public body 
‘Power sector decarbonisation makes security and flexibility inherently a 
local issue, mostly relating to UK-based generation from indigenous 
resources.  
Modelling analyst in a public sector body 
Participants were also asked to identify the main sources of security and flexibility for the 
UK electricity system in 2040 from a given list (or alternatively offer their own suggestions). 
The results, shown in Figure 4, revealed high expectations about the future role of demand 
side management and response (DSM&R), with 82 votes; other sources seen as likely to play 
a were local generation and storage (with 67 votes) and international interconnectors (63 
votes). 




Some respondents were reluctant to choose between different sources of flexibility and 
security, and instead emphasised multi-scale provision, with the gradual emergence of more 
local sources. However, several comments anticipated a key future role for DSM&R and 
local storage: 
  ‘[The] business and technological case for large-scale storage seems 
weaker than digitally-enabled distributed storage and production.’ 
Lecturer in social science 
 ‘EVs [electric vehicles], electrified heat … and distributed energy storage 
will result in huge flexibility resources being located on the local 
distribution networks.’ 
Mid-management industry specialist 
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Others expressed caution about the likely contribution of DSM&R and local storage, and 
suggested that large scale sources of security and flexibility would continue to play an 
important role, especially for inter-seasonal response: 
‘I am not convinced of the potential for DSR to deliver the large volumes of 
balancing needed.’ 
Director in a public-private partnership 
‘Long term variations will require very large stores and interconnectors on 
large national/international scales’. 
Professor of energy modelling 
In Round 2, only 17% of participants changed their rankings of the main sources of flexibility 
for UK electricity supply in 2040; only a quarter of these (just three respondents) explicitly 
mentioned Round 1 results in explaining their changed view – two were persuaded to add 
DSM&R to their list and one added international interconnectors. Five others questioned or 
criticised Round 1 results while not changing their own view. Free text comments showed 
continuing disagreement about the impact of DSM&R: some saw them as unlikely to play a 
major role by 2040 because of long roll-out times, the need for consumer buy-in and their 
inability to offer inter-seasonal response. Others argued that some forms of DSM&R require 
very little consumer involvement and could play a key role by 2040. 
3.4 Innovations for decarbonising power 
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Participants were asked to rank a range of social and technological innovations in terms of 
their contribution to UK electricity system decarbonisation from now to 2040, from a list of 
suggested options or by nominating others. As shown in Figure 5, large-scale renewables 
emerged as the highest ranked innovation, by some margin (with 82 votes); other highly 
ranked innovations included demand side management and response (DSM&R) (63 votes), 
digitalisation and smart grids (45 votes) and buildings scale microgeneration / prosumers 
(41 votes).   
On large-scale renewables, respondents pointed to a strong track record of deployment and 
falling costs. One respondent identified the benefit of having a small number of centralised 
actors involved: 
‘Renewables have had a large impact … prices are still falling and 
installations increasing. While smart grids / demand response can help, I 
think these will be the secondary rather than primary contributors.’ 
Senior academic interdisciplinary researcher 
‘Large scale renewables and smart grids are both areas that involve 
relatively few decision-makers – so I expect them to have significant 
carbon reduction impact.’ 
Early-career academic social scientist 




Again, a number of participants highlighted cross-scale synergies, with DSM&R 
complementing large scale renewables deployment. Several comments drew unfavourable 
comparisons between large scale thermal generation technologies (CCS and nuclear power) 
and large-scale renewables coupled with demand side management. One respondent noted 
the ‘political will’ barrier facing some large scale technologies: 
‘Nuclear power and CCS are moving too slowly, although I do worry that 
without them targets will not be reached.’ 
Director in a public-private partnership 
 ‘CCS and nuclear depend on political commitment in order to happen, this 
may crystallise in the long term, but the easier and cheaper things will 
happen first’ 
Mid-career environment advisor in a public body 
30 
 
There were mixed views about the role of municipal energy – one respondent put it centre-
stage, while others noted that local energy projects tended not to prioritise 
decarbonisation: 
‘A combination of municipal energy supplier and support for 
building-scale microgeneration would make the biggest contribution 
to decarbonising the electrical energy system.’ 
Mid-management industry 
specialist 
 ‘Municipally-owner energy suppliers might be more prolific but they 
often have other goals aside from decarbonisation.’ 
Mid-career academic engineer 
In Round 2, 12 respondents changed their rankings (17% of the Round 1 sample) – none of 
whom made an explicit reference to Round 1 results. Eight of these either added-in DSM&R 
or promoted it in their rankings, although a senior engineer at a government body 
expressed concern that their large anticipated role among other respondents was “overly 
ambitious”. Two others added-in digitalisation and smart grids, and an independent 
consultant acknowledged the doubts voiced about CCS but argued that there remained no 
alternative. 
3.5 The future of large supply firms 
Participants were asked to assess the likelihood of the following proposition: 
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 By 2040, new intermediaries, aggregators and community energy companies will 
have largely replaced the dominance of the large utility firms supplying electricity in 
the UK  
The results, in Figure 6, show more respondents saw this proposition as unlikely or highly 
unlikely (46% of all respondents) than likely or highly likely (36%), while 18% of respondents 
were unwilling or unable to say. 
Figure 6: The replacement of large utility firms supplying electricity by 2040 
 
Several respondents argued that large supply firms would continue to exploit economies of 
scale, and exert significant market power and political influence:  
 ‘New business models will have a role to play, but I don't think they will 
replace the dominance of the large utility firms.’ 
Senior official in a government body  
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‘Economies of scale will dominate and most of the UK's electricity will 
continue be supplied by large companies … New ideas will likely be 
appropriated, absorbed, and repurposed by the existing players.’ 
Senior academic physical scientist 
Some argued that disruption to large energy suppliers would be resisted because it would 
present a risk to system stability and security: 
‘This [proposition] is unlikely because there will need to [be] good 
coordination and regulation. The risk to the supply security is high.’ 
Professor of engineering 
‘Energy system stability at the national/international level requires large 
utility management’ 
Professor of energy modelling 
Others noted that change was already happening and would accelerate as digital 
technologies opened up new business models and market opportunities: 
 ‘As soon as smart meters are prevalent, the value in the data will cause 
tech companies to flood into the market. The sticky customer pool will 
dwindle and become more of a hassle to the Big 6 as prices are capped.’  
Senior official in a public body 
Other respondents emphasised the more heterogeneous make-up of future supply, with a 
continuing, but reduced, role for large supplier firms: 
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 ‘There will be large national providers … but not the current firms and not 
with the same dominance of the market.’ 
Senior regulation specialist in an energy company 
‘New providers will develop ways of fulfilling our needs for comfort etc. in 
combination with other services, rather than selling a commodity. Change is 
inevitable.’ 
Senior engineer at a government body 
In Round 2, only 5 participants changed their answer (just 7% of the total Round 2 sample), 
only one of whom made explicit reference to Round 1 results. Of those changing ‘sides’ (i.e. 
shifting from likely to unlikely, or vice versa) two were persuaded that big energy suppliers 
would adapt, while one was convinced by the contrary argument: 
‘Agree with the majority. Big companies will adapt, and stay big. They've 
the necessary capital for innovation.’ 
Senior academic social scientist 
‘I now feel that … the incumbents will be usurped. They won't be able to 
adapt their monolithic business structures and organisations in time.’ 
Academic environmental economist  
3.6 Policy priorities 
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Participants were asked for their views on the UK’s energy policy priorities. The first 
question asked for an assessment of the importance of four high level policy drivers 
between now and 2040. While the majority of respondents saw all four policy drivers as 
either a ‘high’ or ‘moderately high’ priority, ‘decarbonisation and a green economy’ 
emerged as the highest priority (judged a ‘high priority’ by 76% respondents), followed by 
energy security (49%), affordability for customers (34%) and industrial strategy and local / 
regional economic growth (29%).  
In Round 2, Only three respondents changed their Likert scale choices, only one of whom explicitly 
mentioned Round 1 results to justify their change – to criticise the relatively low ranking of 
affordability. Three others questioned or criticised others’ views in Round 1, while maintaining their 
own view; comments here criticised the relatively low ranking of security, affordability and ‘jobs’ 
concerns, with one respondent suggesting that the ‘downplaying’ of affordability concerns was a 
result of ‘academic bias’. (The results showed no statistically significant difference between 
academic and non-academic respondent groups on this issue). 
Participants were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a list of more specific 
policy actions. Among these, ‘Establishing energy demand reduction as a policy priority’ 
emerged as the most popular action, with 62% strongly agreeing). Other proposals included 
‘supporting greater citizen involvement in regional and local planning for energy projects’ 
(30% strongly agreeing), ‘using competitive markets and auctions to support low carbon 
technologies’ (26%), ‘supporting and accelerating the transition towards distributed energy 
generation and storage’ (21%) and ‘facilitating a devolved and regionally-led approach to 
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energy system change’ (19%). In respondents’ comments, there were some differences on 
whether policy should actively promote decentralisation and localisation:  
‘There is potential for significant devolved and regionally led delivery if it is 
appropriately facilitated.’ 
Director in a public-private partnership 
‘I am torn … about a regionally-led transition … there are pros and cons to 
this approach, and in some cases … it makes sense to focus on large-scale 
change’ 
Early-career academic social scientist 
In Round 2, only two respondents changed their Likert scale answers on policy actions, with 
just one making explicit reference to Round 1 results. In both cases, these were to give a 
higher priority toward ‘striving for energy independence and avoiding import-dependence’.  
4 Summary and Discussion  
4.1 Summary 
Overall, the UK energy researchers and stakeholders surveyed here offer a mixed response 
to the ‘smart and local energy revolution’ proposition. A partial shift toward more local 
governance and infrastructure over the next two decades is seen as likely, but at the same 
time national governance and infrastructure are considered critical by many, and statistical 
analysis shows that the majority of participants do not accept the wholesale energy 
revolution proposition (see Appendix B). Qualitative data analysis suggests that this mixed 
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response goes beyond assessments of likelihood: while many respondents recognise the 
gathering momentum behind the smart and local energy revolution proposition and express 
some support for policy measures associated with it, others question its merits and 
desirability.  
In some areas respondents anticipate a significant trend to smart and local system 
operation. For example, a majority of experts expect more distributed energy system 
governance, and for energy security and flexibility to be mostly provided locally by 2040. 
There are also high expectations about the role of demand side management and response 
and local embedded generation and storage in the future power system, although others – 
including many domain specialists – question the system-wide significance of these 
developments. There is also widespread support for policy measures to promote distributed 
energy, but alongside other measures focussed on national or individual scales.  
In other ways, respondents were cautious or questioning about the smart and local energy 
revolution proposition. On governance, most expected only limited redistribution of powers 
by 2040, with national organisations remaining key system strategists. On the future of large 
supplier firms, many thought it unlikely that large utilities would be wholly replaced by new 
organisations. In terms of overall policy goals, decarbonisation and the development of a 
green economy were seen by most as a higher priority than industrial strategy and local and 
regional economic growth.   
Respondents’ written comments help explain the mixed response to the smart and local 
energy revolution proposition. For example, the widely expected continuation of central 
governance reflected a view of the continuing political and strategic importance of energy – 
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but also, a view among some that localisation might undermine energy transition efforts by 
increasing costs or reducing transparency. Others see local energy governance as an 
important enabler of the transition, or consider that gathering local political interests will 
outweigh other concerns. Many respondents highlight the multi-scale interdependencies of 
energy systems.  
Other comments note the uncertain dynamics of energy transition, including policy and 
strategy choices and outcomes. On the future incumbent firms, many respondents expect 
large suppliers to adapt to change and retain an important ongoing role in system co-
ordination, while others extrapolated from emerging developments in supply business 
models to anticipate a much more disruptive future. There were also differing preferences 
about the scale dynamics of transitions: for some, large scale technologies and concentrated 
agency offer the best path for rapid change, but for others small scale technologies and 
distributed agency are more promising (see Wilson, 2018). 
 
4.2 Explaining response patterns: the role of status, discipline and expertise 
Responses to the vast majority of the survey questions and prompts covered here (84%) 
showed no statistically significant difference between academic and non-academic 
stakeholder groups (at the 95% confidence level). Even where a statistically significant 
difference was found, in most cases there was no difference in the majority view or the 
median value of Likert scale responses – differences tended to be in the strength of 
agreement or disagreement rather than across the agree-disagree divide. For example, on 
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governance, almost half (49%) of academics consider that national strategy and planning 
will remain dominant in 2040, compared to only 27% of non-academics – suggesting 
academics are relatively continuity-led oriented on this question. On other issues, however, 
such as whether large scale national storage will play an important role in the UK electricity 
system in 2040 – a relatively continuity-based proposition – non-academics show greater 
support (80% of non-academics selected this option, compared to 61% of academics).  
On preferred policy measures, although there was no statistically significant difference 
between academics and stakeholders on high-level policy drivers, some differences were 
seen in preferred policy measures, though again this tended to be in terms of the strength 
of support. In some cases, academics show stronger support for some relatively disruptive 
measures, such as assisting new entrants in the energy market (89% of academics agreed or 
strongly agreed with this measure, compared to 64% of non-academics) and facilitating a 
devolved approach to energy system change (supported by 89% of academics compared to 
69% of non-academics). In other areas, however, there is little difference: over 90% of both 
groups agreed or strongly agree with measures to assist the digitalisation of energy systems, 
and over 85% of both groups agree or strongly agree with using competitive markets to 
promote low carbon technologies.  
Respondents’ disciplinary backgrounds are also largely insignificant in accounting for 
variations in response. Only one of the survey propositions in Section 3 shows a statistically 
significant difference by discipline (at the 95% confidence level), on ‘establishing energy 
demand reduction as a policy priority’. Again, though, this was a difference of strength of 
support, and all disciplinary groups supported this proposition to some extent. Considering 
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only ‘monodisciplinary’ respondents (many respondents identified themselves as having 
multiple disciplinary backgrounds), 87% of social scientists strongly agreed with this 
proposition, compared to only 43% of engineers.  
There are also few significant differences of view according to levels of expertise. The only 
statistically significant difference between domain experts and other respondents (at the 
95% confidence level) was on the main sources of UK electricity system flexibility in 2040 
(Section 3.3, above). Here, respondents who self-identify as security and flexibility experts 
are more likely than other respondents to select large scale sources of security and 
flexibility: 75% of domain experts selected international interconnectors, compared to 46% 
of non-domain experts, while 39% of domain experts selected large scale gas-fired 
generation, compared to 23% of non-domain experts.  
In their comments, domain experts noted the reliability and cost effectiveness of large scale 
security and flexibility technologies, and the need for such technologies to support the 
further diffusion of intermittent renewables. Security and flexibility experts are also less 
likely to support policy measures associated with the smart and local energy revolution (see 
section 3.6, above), including actions to support a devolved and regionally-led approach to 
energy system change (this was strongly agreed or agreed to by 88% of non-domain experts 
but only 62% of domain experts) and accelerating the transition towards distributed energy 
generation and storage (strongly agreed or agreed to by 93% of non-domain experts but 
only 59% of domain experts). 
Although security and flexibility experts tend to react relatively cautiously to some aspects 
of the smart and local energy revolution proposition, this does not correspond to significant 
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differences by discipline. Just over a quarter (27%) of all our respondents identify 
themselves as security and flexibility domain experts. Of these, 37% have multiple 
disciplinary affiliations and 30% offered no disciplinary affiliation – only 29% identify as 
either engineers or economists (and there is no statistically significant difference between 
the ‘engineers or economists’ group and other groups on this question). Overall, therefore, 
respondents’ orientations to disruptive or continuity-led transition and the smart and local 
energy revolution proposition are not decisively influenced by their differing levels of 
expertise, status as academics or non-academics, or disciplinary background. 
Across the sample as a whole, individual respondents showed varied issue-specific 
orientations to the smart and local energy revolution proposition. These issue-specific 
orientations are durable, in that second round survey participants overwhelmingly 
reaffirmed rather than changed their views. However, looking across the multiple issues 
considered here, over three-quarters of respondents (79%) show neither a strongly 
disruptive nor strongly continuity-led overall orientation – 19% can be considered to have 
an overall orientation to disruptive change and 3% to continuity-led change (see Appendix 
B). This means that rather than having fixed overarching orientations to energy system 
dynamics, most experts consider the likelihood and desirability of disruption and continuity-
led change on an issue-by-issue basis, going beyond uniform transition narratives. 
 
4.3 Our findings in context 
41 
 
Only tentative comparisons can be made between our results and other surveys, given 
differences in research design and methods. For example, the Delphi Energy Future 2040 
(DEF) findings (BDEW et al., 2016), although having similar broad aims and design to our 
survey, addressed international energy dynamics rather than country specific issues, and its 
respondents were mostly European-based (over half of all respondents were German-
based), mostly drawn from the public sector, businesses and civil society groups (only 15 % 
were from the science and research sector).  
Acknowledging these differences, some comparison is possible: for example, a majority 
(around 70%) of DEF respondents considered that decentralisation of energy systems was 
‘likely’ or ‘certain’, with a strong envisaged role for municipalities and prosumers in 
distributed energy governance; large scale technologies such as CCS and nuclear power 
were seen as much less likely to play a significant role. Two-thirds of DEF survey 
respondents considered that traditional energy companies would be displaced by 2040, and 
over 90% thought power trading markets would be ‘disintegrated’ over the same period, 
particularly in Europe or North America. This suggests a stronger orientation towards a 
disruptive energy transition in the DEF survey than in our findings. Explaining this difference 
is not straightforward, but recognising that experts show a range of contextual biases 
(Burgman, 2015), it may reflect differences in energy transitions in Germany and the UK, 
with Germany pursuing a more local and decentralised path (Geels et al., 2016)   
There are also some similarities and differences in the Energy Institute’s annual Energy 
Barometer surveys and our survey (Energy Institute, 2019, et seq.), perhaps reflecting 
different response bases and survey designs (see 2.1, above). For example, there was a 
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difference in 2019 Barometer respondents’ overall policy priorities compared to our results, 
with energy security rather than decarbonisation ranked highest (Energy Institute, 2019). 
The most important emerging innovations over the next 10 years were grid-scale battery 
storage, demand-side response and small scale battery storage; expectations for nuclear 
power and CCS have declined over successive Barometer surveys (Energy Institute, 2019). 
While two thirds of 2017 Barometer respondents considered a shift to more decentralised 
business models as being highly likely, the UK national government – rather than devolved 
or local governments – was seen as the key governance body for the UK energy transition 
(Energy Institute, 2017). Overall, the Barometer’s results, like ours, suggest that the UK 
energy transition will be shaped by a mix of disruptive and continuity based dynamics. 
5 Conclusions and Implications 
A smart and local energy revolution narrative has recently emerged in the UK and 
elsewhere, sitting alongside highly ambitious goals for decarbonisation. Understanding the 
significance of the energy revolution proposition in the context of the UK’s energy transition 
goals was seen here as a challenge to interdisciplinary expertise, and the holistic analysis of 
change.  
Our results suggest that while energy experts see smartness and localisation becoming more 
important over the next two decades, under a wave of digital and distributed innovations 
and a gathering local political imperative, they are not expected to dominate whole system 
change. Most researchers and stakeholders expect the UK energy transition to be shaped by 
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repurposing alongside disruption, and by complementarities between new and established 
infrastructure and organisations, with large infrastructures and organisations likely to play 
key continuing roles. Suggestions of an imminent wholesale energy revolution were largely 
refuted.  
This mixed response does not simply reflect a battle between old and new vested interests 
(‘incumbents versus new entrants’), as our survey respondents were mostly independent 
publicly funded research academic researchers. Instead, it appears to reflect some 
important uncertainties associated with the energy revolution proposition – for example, on 
the system-level significance of smart innovations in delivering the energy transition, but 
also, more subjective and indeterminate aspects, for example, on the merits and desirability 
of decentralised governance. 
In more specific, bounded areas of disagreement, such as the impact of demand side 
management and response for whole system flexibility and security, additional evidence 
should help resolve expert differences, and support for demonstrations and evidence 
reviews is recommended in these areas. In more indeterminate and subjective areas, such 
as governance arrangements, the differences are unlikely to be reconciled through 
improved evidence, and the need here is for strong independent analytical capacity and 
more understanding of the values which inform expertise (Pielke, Jr, 2007; Li and Pye, 2018).   
Following the call from Lagendijk and Van der Vleuten (2013) our results help ‘open-up' 
transition narratives. From a historically informed perspective, questioning the likelihood 
and desirability of an infrastructure revolution is unsurprising. As with earlier episodes of 
change, the smart and local energy revolution proposition is socially constructed, and 
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political contestation and policy choice – as well as evidence – will determine the extent to 
which it is realised.  
For whole systems research, our results reaffirm the value of allowing a variety of well-
informed experts to transparently interrogate alternative futures. Philip Tetlock (2010, 
p.472) has described this as improving the “integrative complexity of public debate and 
serv[ing] as a break on polarization”. Holistic interdisciplinary analysis is challenging, but it 
offers more robust policy guidance than uniform transition narratives. 
  
Appendices 
Appendix A: Non-academic survey respondents, by expert type and scenario 
orientation 
Organisation Type Expert Type* Scenario Orientation** 
Government department Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
Government department Mandated Neither 
City council Mandated Neither 
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National executive agency  Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
Energy regulator  Mandated Neither 
Parliamentary advisory body Mandated Neither 
Parliamentary advisory body Mandated Neither 
Government department Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
National executive agency Mandated Neither 
Government department Mandated Neither 
National innovation agency Mandated Neither 
Energy system operator Mandated Neither 
National innovation agency Mandated Neither 
Energy system operator Mandated Neither 
Nuclear regulator Subjective Continuity 
Large energy company Subjective Continuity 
Industry association Subjective Continuity 
Large energy company Subjective Continuity 
Large gas company Subjective Continuity 
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Industry association Subjective Continuity 
Independent supply company Subjective Disruptive 
Independent supply company Subjective Disruptive 
Third sector organisation Subjective Neither 
Independent consultant Subjective Neither 
Independent consultant Subjective Neither 
Independent consultant Subjective Neither 
Independent consultant Subjective Neither 
Independent consultancy Subjective Neither 
Buildings consultancy Subjective Disruptive 
Independent consultant Subjective Neither 
Industry association Subjective Disruptive 
Third sector organisation Subjective Neither 
Third sector organisation Subjective Neither 
Independent consultancy Subjective Neither 
Third sector organisation Subjective Neither 
Third sector organisation Subjective Neither 
Independent think tank Subjective Disruptive 
Third sector organisation Subjective Neither 
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Table A1: Non-academic survey respondents, by expert type and scenario orientation 
 *Based on Needham and de Loë’s (1990) expert typology 
** See Section 2.3, page 7.  
 
Appendix B: Statistical Analysis of Whole Sample Orientation 
In order to statistically analyse whether the survey sample as a whole showed an 
orientation to either continuity-led or disruptive change, a scoring system was devised, with 
each survey question or statement assigned a Disruption or Continuity (‘D or C’) score, 
ranging from +2 to – 2 – with +2 representing a ‘highly disruptive’ orientation, +1 
‘disruptive’, 0 ‘neither disruptive nor continuity-led, -1 ‘continuity-led’ and -2 as ‘highly 
continuity-led’. The authors then assessed each survey question or statement against this 
metric according to the extent to which it is judged consistent with a disruptive or 
continuity-based transition narrative. The ratings for each question are listed in Table A1. 
Table A2: Disruption or Continuity Ratings for Specific Survey Questions 
Survey Topic Specific Statement 
D or C score for 
likely/highly likely 
(or selection, for 
innovations) 
D or C score of unlikely 




Energy system decisively decentralised 2 -2 
Greater spread of powers but central strategists 1 -1 





Security and Flexibility 
Arrangements 
 
Heat - will local sources dominate? 2 -2 
Power - will local sources dominate? 2 -2 
Main sources of security 
and flexibility for UK 
electricity system 
DSM&R (DSM) 1 0 
Local embedded generation and storage 2 0 
International interconnections -2 0 
Individual buildings' generation & storage 2 0 
Large scale national storage -2 0 
Large scale gas-fired generation -2 0 
Innovations for 
decarbonising the UK's 
electricity system 
Large-scale renewables -2 0 
DSM&R 1 0 
Digitalisation and smart grids 2 0 
Buildings scale microgeneration / prosumers  2 0 
Low energy behaviours / practices 0 0 
CCS -2 0 
Nuclear power -2 0 
Municipal-owned energy suppliers 2 0 
The future of large 
electricity suppliers 
New intermediaries, aggregators and community 
energy companies will have largely replaced the 






Of 127 Round 1 participants, 14 did not answer any of these questions; these participants 
were filtered out. Of the 113 valid responses, the frequency table (Table A2) and histogram 
(Figure A1) below show the distribution of participants’ overall ‘D or C’ scores across all 
questions in this analysis. The range of possible ‘D or C’ scores is +23 (for maximum 
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disruption) and -23 (for maximum continuity-led change). Although there is a slight overall 
tendency to disruption, as the mean is +2.57 and the median is +3.00, statistical tests do not 
confirm that the distribution significantly differs from normal. For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, p =0.02, which is marginally significant at the 95% confidence level, but for the more 
powerful Shapiro-Wilk test, p= 0.83, which is not statistically significant. As the Shapiro-Wilk 
test is not significant, we cannot be confident that this sample deviates from a normal 
distribution.  
The distribution of individual respondent scores suggests that most experts do not expect 
disruption (or continuity) forces to dominate the UK energy system transition – most expect 
a combination of disruptive and continuity-led dynamics, with some areas seeing relatively 
disruptive change, and other areas more continuity-led change. Over three-quarters of all 
respondents (79%) score within a range of +11.5 to -11.5 (i.e. neither strongly disruptive nor 
strongly continuity-led), with 19% scoring over +11.5 (oriented to disruptive change) and 3% 
scoring less than -11.5 (oriented to continuity-led change.  
 
Table A3: The distribution of participants' overall scores across all questions in the paper (n= 
113)  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
D or C 
Score 
-12.00 1 .9 .9 .9 
-10.00 2 1.8 1.8 2.7 
-8.00 3 2.7 2.7 5.3 
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-6.00 2 1.8 1.8 7.1 
-5.00 5 4.4 4.4 11.5 
-4.00 4 3.5 3.5 15.0 
-3.00 6 5.3 5.3 20.4 
-2.00 5 4.4 4.4 24.8 
-1.00 6 5.3 5.3 30.1 
.00 7 6.2 6.2 36.3 
1.00 14 12.4 12.4 48.7 
3.00 8 7.1 7.1 55.8 
4.00 5 4.4 4.4 60.2 
5.00 10 8.8 8.8 69.0 
6.00 6 5.3 5.3 74.3 
7.00 7 6.2 6.2 80.5 
8.00 3 2.7 2.7 83.2 
9.00 5 4.4 4.4 87.6 
10.00 3 2.7 2.7 90.3 
11.00 4 3.5 3.5 93.8 
12.00 1 .9 .9 94.7 
13.00 4 3.5 3.5 98.2 
14.00 1 .9 .9 99.1 
19.00 1 .9 .9 100.0 
Total 113 100.0 100.0  
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